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Abstract
Does climate change policy cause companies to shift the location of production, thereby
creating carbon leakage? We examine the impact of the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing System (EU ETS) on the geographical distribution of carbon emissions within multi-
national companies based on data from the Carbon Disclosure Project for the period 2007-
2009. Our data includes regional emissions of 435 companies, of which 47 are subject to
EU ETS regulation. We find no evidence that the EU ETS has induced a displacement
of carbon emissions from Europe towards the rest of the world. Our results suggest that
claims that the EU ETS would cause carbon leakage might have been exaggerated.
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1 Introduction
With the implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and
a range of other policies, mostly supporting the deployment of renewable energy technolo-
gies, the EU is widely perceived as the vanguard of climate change policy globally. However,
this unilateral set of policies has raised concerns that EU governments are threatening the
international competitiveness of Europe-based companies, in particular for carbon and energy
intensive industries. Indeed, in a free-trade world, increased carbon prices following adoption of
unilateral climate policies may generate a pollution-haven e↵ect in other countries or regions,
whereby foreign countries specialise in the production of carbon-intensive products in which
they have a newly acquired competitive advantage and which they can subsequently export
back to “virtuous” countries. If the result of climate policy is a relocation of economic activity
to less-regulated regions, then the policy is not only ine↵ective from a climate change point of
view (as emissions are likely relocating with production, rather than reducing) but also costly
from an economic point of view, by destroying jobs in environmentally-friendly countries. This
issue has been referred to as “carbon leakage” and has attracted a lot of attention in the recent
literature.
In this paper we explore this hypothesis using a unique sample of panel data on carbon emis-
sions for 435 multinational companies. Multinational companies with operations across a wide
range of jurisdictions might be particularly prone to react to regulation that imposes higher
costs in some locations by shifting production to less regulated regions. Our data comes from
the Carbon Disclosure Project, a non-profit data collection initiative established by parts of
the investment community to collect climate change-relevant data at the level of individual
businesses. Emissions for multinational businesses are broken down by country. Hence we can
study whether multinationals reduce emissions in one location only to increase them elsewhere.
Specifically we compare emissions in Europe with emissions occuring outside Europe within the
same company between 2007 and 2009. On the basis of this data, we cannot find any evidence
for leakage of carbon out of Europe. This conclusion does not only emerge for the average firm
in our sample but also for various sub-samples, including - most importantly - firms that are
deemed by the European Commission to be particularly at risk of carbon leakage because they
are highly carbon-intensive or trade-exposed.
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This paper relates to the vast literature that seeks to estimate the impact of unilateral climate
change policies on carbon leakage (see Dechezlepretre and Sato on energy prices and Dechezle-
pretre and Misato (policy brief) for recent reviews)1. This literature has so far mainly used
ex-ante model simulation strategies, typically using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
models and there are still few empirical contributions to this subject. These studies have estim-
ated a wide range of leakage rates associated to di↵erent emission reduction targets under the
Kyoto Protocol. Dro¨ge (2009) reports rates between 5 and 25%, while Lanz and Rausch (2011)
find central estimates in the range of 15–30%. However, some studies find negative leakage rates
due to spillover e↵ects (e.g. Barker et al. (2007)) while some others report leakage rates above
100% implying that emission reduction e↵orts in one region are more than compensated by in-
creased emissions in other regions, for example because production shifts to less-technologically
advanced (and thus more carbon-intensive) regions. In the context of the EU ETS, partial equi-
librium models have also been used, observing sectoral di↵erences in carbon leakage rates due
to di↵erences in carbon intensity of production, abatement potential, transport costs, product
di↵erentiation and others parameters. Generally the steel sector, characterized by both high
product di↵erentiation and abatement potential, has been found to experience higher leakage
rates (see Sato (2013)). Overall, these results are very sensitive to model assumption and are
suggestive of a large uncertainty, highlighting the need for empirical studies to better identify
the magnitude of the e↵ect of climate change regulation on carbon leakage.
Recent work has made empirical contributions to this question. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012)
and Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) analyse the impact of carbon emissions reduction commit-
ments taken under the Kyoto Protocol on carbon leakege and find statistically significant and
large e↵ects. In the former paper, the authors find that the Kyoto commitment is associated
with an increase in the ratio of imported embodied carbon emissions over domestic emissions by
about 14%. Using a matching technique, the latter paper finds that exports by Kyoto countries
are reduced by 13% to 14% following the signing of the protocol. Gerlagh and Mathys (2011)
also provide empirical evidence supporting the carbon leakage e↵ect. Using a panel of 14 high
income countries over 28 years, they analyze the impact of energy abundance on country net
exports and find that energy abundant countries have a higher level of energy embodied in
1See also Sato (2013) for a comprehensive review of the literature that seeks to measure the carbon content
of trade.
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exports relative to imports.
A few recent studies have begun to investigate the impact of the EU ETS on carbon leakage.
Martin et al. (2013b) review the ex-post empirical evidence of the impact of the EU ETS
on carbon leakage. Although the studies outcomes di↵er across papers, there is overall no
indication that the EU ETS had any strong negative e↵ects on the economic performance
of regulated firms and that it would have led to carbon leakage. Firm-level evidence from
the French manufacturing sector shows no significant reduction of turnover during phases I
or II (Wagner et al., 2013). A negative employment impact arises in a cross-country study, in
particular in the non-metallic minerals industry (Abrell et al., 2011), suggesting that production
might have shifted as a consequence of the EU ETS. In contrast, German manufacturing firms
show no significant reduction in employment and turnover as a result of the EU ETS (Wagner
et al., 2014). This is in line with sector-level evidence showing that firms’ market power
allows them to pass through the cost increases induced by carbon trading on to product prices
(De Bruyn et al., 2008). Finally, Martin et al. (2013a) survey close to 800 manufacturing firms
in six EU countries. Firms regulated under the EU ETS report a higher propensity to downsize
their operations in response to future carbon pricing than non-EU ETS firms, but the overall
e↵ect is not large.
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing new evidence on the link between EU
ETS regulation and carbon leakage. Thanks to the data collected by the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP), we are able to track firm level CO2 emissions for 6 years since 2005. Exploiting
information on the country of origin of carbon emissions, we can directly assess the carbon
leakage hypothesis by comparing the trend in CO2 emissions of EU ETS regulated firms in
European relative to non European countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the di↵erent datasets
used, in particular that obtained from CDP. Section 3 describes the method adopted for the
data analysis and section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and descriptive statistics
We construct an unbalanced panel of firms for the period 2005-2010 by combining di↵erent
data sources. The data on annual firm level carbon emissions come from the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP), an NGO acting on behalf of over 600 institutional investors which every year
since 2003 asked listed companies to disclose information on emissions. More recently CDP
also included non listed firms in its surveys. We obtain data on turnover, assets and sector of
activity of these companies from ORBIS, one of the largest global financial firm level database
maintained by Bureau van Dijk. Finally, we use the European Union Transaction Log to
identify companies owning at least one installation regulated under the EU ETS 2.
As shown in Figure 1, the bulk of observations covers the 2007-2009 period. Our analysis
therefore focuses on these three years of data3. The sample for these years is constituted of 435
companies, 47 of which are regulated under the EU ETS and 388 companies are not regulated.
Figure 1: Number of Observations over the Period 2005-2010.
Figure 2 displays the sectoral distribution of the companies in our sample. The firms we observe
2For some countries in our sample, the company registration numbers of the installation operators were
obtained directly, either from national emissions trading registries or from the European Union Transaction Log
(EUTL) (the EU body to which national registries report). For the other countries, a combination of exact and
approximate text matching methods were used to establish a link between firm data and regulatory data. This
was complemented by further manual searches, and extensive manual double-checking.
3In the Appendix we also report the results using data for the period 2005-2010.
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are the ones who voluntarily answer the CDP questionnaire so they represent a subset of listed
firms. The majority of these companies comes from the materials, utilities and energy sectors.
The sample also includes a large number of companies operating in the banking and financial
sector.
Figure 2: Distribution of Companies Across Indutry Sectors
In Figure 3 we show the distribution of companies, focusing only on sectors where ETS firms
operate. As expected the majority of ETS companies in the sample operate in the utility,
capital goods and energy sectors.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Companies across Industries where ETS Firms Operate
With non mandatory participation in the CDP carbon reporting program and a focus on listed
companies, concerns of selection bias might arise. There is an extensive literature studying the
likelihood of companies to report their emissions. For example, some recent contributions (Reid
and To↵el (2009); Brouhle and Harrington (2009); Matsumura et al. (2011)) have shown that
companies operating in cleaner sectors are more likely to report their environmental activity.
This is also true of companies performing better relative to others from their sectors. Reporting
also increases with the proportion of reporting firms in the same sector. However, such issues
are less of a concern with the CDP data. Firstly, while the CDP survey is not mandatory,
firms have an additional incentive to participate as CDP acts as an agent for a group of large
investment firms. This setup introduces a somewhat di↵erent reputational driver: refusal to
take part could send a negative signal to potentially important investors and sources of finance
for a firm. Second, participating firms are given the choice to be featured in the outward facing
CDP report or only to be included in background data and confidential reports to investors.
Our results are based on data that includes either type of firm.
Besides, there are some concerns about the consistency of survey quality across firms and over
time and the lack of verification of survey answers . However, for the purpose of this study,
these issues are only of concern if they vary systematically between ETS and non ETS firms.
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3 Methods
There is a wide range of potential definitions and types of carbon leakage. The main contri-
bution of this paper is that the data allows us for the first time to study leakage within firms.
Leakage from the EU is understood here as the amount of CO2 emissions re-located within
multinational firms as a direct consequence of the introduction of climate policies within the
EU. In Appendix A we introduce this more formally.
The carbon leakage hypothesis is explored by looking at two types of indices of firm-level
changes in emissions. First, we compare the growth rate of a firm’s EU and non EU (RoW)
emissions:
gRit =
CO2Rit   CO2Rit 1
0.5 (CO2Rit + CO2
R
it 1)
(1)
where R 2 {EU,RoW}. An indication for leakage would be the finding of negative emission
growth in the EU that goes along with positive emission growth in the RoW. If firms subject
to climate regulation also have stronger positive demand shocks or weaker productivity shocks
than non or less regulated control firms, then leakage would imply that EU emissions grow
slower that RoW emissions.
Secondly, we examine firm-level changes in the share of emissions from within the EU:
 sEUit = s
EU
it   sEUit 1 (2)
where sEUit =
sEUit
sEUit +s
RoW
it
is the share of EU CO2 emissions for firm i at time t. If carbon was
systematically leaking from the EU within MNEs, we would expect  SHEUit to be on average
negative, and even more so for firms most targeted by climate policies such as the EU ETS.
An advantage of looking at the EU share is that it neutralizes the e↵ect of non-climate policy
shocks that a↵ect all production locations of a firm uniformly.
The e↵ects of the EU ETS are then examined by running regressions of the form:
 sEUit =  ETSi +  Xit + "it (3)
where ETSi is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms regulated by the EU ETS and Xit is a
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vector of control variables.
Note that unfortunately the CDP data only covers years that have followed the introduction of
the EU ETS. However, we can assume that CO2 emissions are complementary to fixed capital
investments. Therefore, there is likely to be an adjustment period in response to changes in
the businesses environment such as the introduction of the EU ETS such that the e↵ects of a
policy change would be hold for an extended period.
The main parameter of interest is   which is expected to be negative if the carbon leakage
hypothesis is true. An important factor that might confound such an interpretation is the fact
that ETS firms by definition have to be located in the EU (at some point) whereas this isn’t the
case for non-ETS firms. Hence any un-observed heterogeneity between EU and non-EU firms
could a↵ect the estimation of  . We address this by estimating equation ?? for a number of
di↵erent subsets of the data. First, the sample is restricted to firms reporting non-zero emissions
in both the EU and outside EU although not necessarily at the same point in time. Second,
we only look at firms with non-zero EU emissions in the base year (t-1). Third, we focus on
firms with non-zero EU emissions in the base year (t-1) and non-zero non-EU emissions at
some point in our sample.
There are potentially further confounding factors distinguishing ETS and non-ETS firms. Most
importantly, ETS firms are exclusively manufacturing firms or power plants.Therefore all the
previous specifications are repeated restricting the sample to firms from those sectors. As an ad-
ditional analysis, the regressions are run on a sub-sample of firms that belong to sectors deemed
“at risk of carbon-leakage” by the EU Commission. Such sectors exceed certain thresholds in
terms of carbon or trade intensity or both. Leakage e↵ects would be expected to be particularly
strong in such sectors.
4 Results
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all 435 companies in the sample.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Sheet1
Page 1
Variables Mean
3.5302 960 CDP
(27.5027)
3.9017 960 CDP
0.3647 960 CDP
13.9819 921
43.1655 718
60.9057 911
Obs. Source
CO
2
 Emissions in Europe (Million Tonnes)
CO
2
 Emissions outside Europe (Million Tonnes)
(19.3696)
Share of CO
2
 Emissions in Europe
(0.4345)
Turnover (in USD Millions) Orbis
(34.3459)
Employees (in Thousands) Orbis
(145.5539)
Assets (in USD Millions) Orbis
(244.2181)
Standard Deviations in parenthesis.
In Table 2 a t-test comparing ETS and non-ETS companies is performed. Not surprisingly, ETS
firms emit more both in European and non-European countries, and most of their production
tends to be located in Europe. ETS firms are on average characterized by a higher turnover
while they are similar to non-ETS firms in the number of employees and assets. The evidence
changes when looking at manufacturing firms only and at firms at risk of carbon leakage. ETS
firms in these two subgroups display significantly higher turnover and assets value than non-
ETS firms. Also, ETS firms in the manufacturing sector are significantly larger in terms of the
number of employees.
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Table 2: ETS vs non-ETS Firms
 
Variables) Non)ETS)firms)
(mean))
(1))
ETS)firms)
(mean))
(2))
Mean)Difference)
(p:value))
))))))))(3))
All)Firms)in)Sample)
!
! ! !
CO2!Emissions!in!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)! 1.2532!
(10.1157)!
25.4706!
(66.1452)!
<24.2173***!
(0)!
CO2!Emissions!outside!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)! 3.2574!
(12.3362)!
11.339!
(37.3757)!
<8.0816***!
(0.002)!
Share!of!CO2!Emissions!in!Europe! 0.3354!
(0.4335)!
0.6241!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(0.3153)!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!<0.2887***!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(0)!
Turnover!(in!USD!Millions)! 12.1091!
(28.2853)!
29.9291!
(55.852)!
<17.82***!
(0)!
Employees!(in!Thousands)! 38.0459!
(131.78)!
50.2680!
(69.0772)!
<12.2220!
(0.5344)!
Assets!(in!USD!Millions)! 62.8483!
(254.2052)!
41.013!
(60.59)!
21.8353!
(0.5623)!
Manufacturing)Firms)
!
! ! !
CO2!Emissions!in!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)!
!
0.6135!
(3.6999)!
4.2792!
(11.1537)!
<3.6657***!
(0.0014)!
CO2!Emissions!outside!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)!
!
4.3425!
(15.4057)!
12.8147!
(44.1212)!
<8.4721*!
(0.0646)!
Share!of!CO2!Emissions!in!Europe!
!
0.2163!
(0.3611)!
0.4949!
(0.3015)!
<0.2785***!
(0.0002)!
Turnover!(in!USD!Millions)!
!
11.6972!
(23.5698)!
35.4178!
(69.9865)!
<23.7206***!
(0.0011)!
Employees!(in!Thousands)!
!
29.8667!
(47.4901)!
59.2632!
(75.8488)!
<29.3965***!
(0.0097)!
Assets!(in!USD!Millions)!
!
12.6957!
(21.5692)!
42.2076!
(69.0610)!
<29.5119***!
(0)!
Manufacturing)Firms!“at)Risk)of)Carbon)Leakage”)
!
! ! !
CO2!Emissions!in!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)!
!
0.3651!
(2.7712)!
5.0452!
(13.6777)!
<4.6801***!
(0.001)!
CO2!Emissions!outside!Europe!(Million!Tonnes)!
!
2.8113!
(10.8562)!
15.0897!
(54.1517)!
<12.2784**!
(0.0299)!
Share!of!CO2!Emissions!in!Europe!
!
0.1853!
(0.3302)!
0.5014!
(0.3000)!
<0.3161***!
(0.0002)!
Turnover!(in!USD!Millions)!
!
10.5470!
(18.4657)!
13.4660!
(12.458)!
<2.9189!
(0.5194)!
Employees!(in!Thousands)!
!
32.8719!
(50.8713)!
37.6708!
(30.0025)!
<4.7989!
(0.6999)!
Assets!(in!USD!Millions)!
!
12.0282!
(19.1876)!
24.6034!
(37.6480)!
<12.5751**!
(0.0303)!
Standard Deviations in parenthesis in columns (1) and (2) and p-values in parenthesis in column (3). Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. 
!
Figure 4 provides a graphical summary of our main findings relating to the growth of emissions.
It reports the joint bi-variate distribution of the growth in CO2 pollution in the EU versus
the Rest of the World (RoW) at the level of firms.4 Panel (a) shows the distribution for all
firms with non-zero EU emissions in the base year. Panel (b) reports only ETS firms. Panel
(c) overlays contour plots from both distributions. Looking first at Panel a we see that the
distribution is concentrated primarily around zero implying that most firms don’t change their
carbon emission very much. There is also a notable mass of firms with positive emissions growth
4See equation 1.
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in both EU and RoW emissions. Panel (b) suggests that emissions growth is more heterogenous
in ETS firms with a more uniform distribution. However, there is little evidence of such firms
simultaneously reducing EU and increasing RoW emissions.Negative emission growth in the EU
is rather associated with negative emission growth in the RoW as well. Hence, this indicates
either genuine emissions reduction e↵orts globally or a decline of these sectors rather than
leakage activity.
Figure 4: The joint distribution of changes in CO2 emissions - EU vs RoW
(a) Firms with positive CO2 in EU in base year
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(c) Overlaid contour plots
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Figure 5 shows the share of CO2 emissions in Europe over the period 2007-2009 for ETS and
non-ETS firms respectively. It is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 2, showing that
ETS-firms generate a larger share of emissions in Europe comparedto non-ETS firms. Between
2007 and 2008, ETS firms display a reduction in this measure compared to a slight increase
experienced by non ETS companies. However on average the two groups follow a similar trend
and the gap between them remains fairly stable over the period.
Figure 5: Share of CO2 Emissions in Europe for ETS and non ETS Firms
Turning to the results relative to the share of EU emissions, Table 3 reports the main regressions
results with the share of EU emissions as the dependent variable. Panel 1 reports regressions for
all firms in our sample, Panel 2 reports on manufacturing firms and Panel 3 on firms in sectors
considered at risk of carbon leakage according to the classification by the EU Commission
(Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC). As discussed above, the Commission determines if
a sector is at risk by looking at carbon and trade intensity.
Moving through the columns of Table 3 we impose di↵erent restrictions regarding regional
presence of firms. In column 2 we only include companies reporting positive emissions both
in EU and RoW although not necessarily at the same time. Column three includes only
observations from companies with positive EU emissions in the first period (t   1). Finally,
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column 4 includes firms with positive EU emissions in the first period and non zero RoW at
some point over the sample. The sub-samples created by cycling through both the panels and
columns of Table 3 serve two purposes. Firstly, by restricting the sample to manufacturing
firms or firms with non zero EU emissions in their first year we make the control group of
non-ETS firms more similar to firms regulated by the ETS.5 Secondly, by focusing on sectors
supposedly at risk of carbon leakage or firms with both EU and RoW emissions we investigate
the potential heterogeneity of leakage e↵ect between firms. Specifically, we would expect that
leakage e↵ects are more severe in groups deemed at risk of carbon leakage by the European
Commission.
Looking at the di↵erent point estimates we see that the coe cient on the ETS indicator is
positive and mostly insignificant throughout Table 3. Therefore we do not find evidence for a
leakage e↵ect, which would be characterized by a negative and statistically significant coe cient.
What is more, it appears that rather than becoming negative - or at least less positive - the
point estimates increase as we move to sub-samples potentially more at risk of leakage in Panel
3.
5A company can only be regulated by the EU ETS if it has emissions within the EU.
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Table 3: Regressions of the share of emissions in EU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Change in share of emissions from Europe
All Firms in Sample
ETS 0.001 0.017 0.017 0.018
(0.018) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 525 197 291 182
R-squared 0.028 0.075 0.057 0.08
Number of Firms 435 172 246 159
Numb er ETS Firms 47 36 46 35
Manufacturing Firms
ETS 0.003 0.021 0.013 0.02
(0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
Observations 218 104 120 93
R-squared 0.012 0.032 0.035 0.048
Number of Firms 183 90 102 81
Numb er ETS Firms 28 26 27 25
Manufacturing Firms “at risk of Carbon Leakage”
ETS 0.022 0.049* 0.032 0.037
(0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 158 77 83 71
R-squared 0.039 0.164 0.092 0.178
Number of Firms 132 68 73
Numb er ETS Firms 18 17 17 16
Year Fixed Efects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Fixed Efects Yes Yes Yes Yes
63
Notes: ETS is a dummy equal to 1 for the ETS regulated companies and zero otherwise. First column: All
companies; Second column: companies reporting positive emissions BOTH in EU and non EU (non
necessarily at the same time); Third column: companies reporting positive emission in EU in their first
period; Fourth column: companies reporting positive emissions in EU in their first period and positive
emission in non EU at some point in time. Clustered standard errors at the company level are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In column 2 we even find that our point estimate is not only positive but also significant at
the 10% level. What could be driving this result? Two possible explanations spring to mind.
Firstly, as discussed in more detail in Appendix A, there might be o↵setting regional specific
productivity shocks that are much stronger than the carbon price shocks implied by the ETS.
Secondly, we have to bear in mind that the EU commission is classifying sectors at risk of
leakage in order to target risk mitigating policy measures. Specifically, sectors “at risk” are
receiving freely allocated emission permits. Hence a positive e↵ect could imply that this policy
is particularly successful to an extent that borders on “reverse leakage”. In future research we
might be able to distinguish better between these two factors using the regression discontinuity
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strategy introduced in Martin et al. (2013a) and XXX Irrespective of the underlying reason it
would seem that the result suggests that carbon leakage cannot be economically meaningful, be
it because other factors are more important in determining the location of emissions or because
anti-leakage policy measures are e↵ective.
We have conducted a number of variations of the analysis reported in Table 3 for robustness
purposes. Some of these are reported in Appendix B. For instance we re-compute the results
in Table ?? while including additional control variables such as changes in capital stocks or
turnover.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses a unique dataset that combines firm-level carbon emissions data with financial
information to study the distribution of carbon emissions within multinational firms across
countries and over time. We focus on the concern that EU climate policy, particularly its
flagship EU Emissions Trading System could lead to carbon leakage; i.e. firms could re-locate
polluting activities to non-EU locations in response to being subjected to the EU ETS. Using
both exploratory data analysis and regression analysis, and looking at a wide range of sub-
samples and specifications we cannot find any evidence for carbon leakage in our data. Our
estimation strategy cannot necessarily reveal the causal e↵ect of the EU ETS on leakage as we
cannot rule out that region specific productivity shocks do not confound the e↵ects of the EU
ETS. However, our results suggest that Carbon Leakage due to the EU ETS is unlikely to have
been an economically meaningful concern until 2009. This might have been di↵erent for the
most recent years of the EU ETS, or could change in the future if EU policy makers increased
further the stringency of the policy. Our future research will explore these questions.
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A A simple model of carbon leakage
This sections introduces a simple model to make precise our definition of Carbon Leakage. We
consider firms producing a final good Q. To produce Q firms can invest capital KR in two
regions R 2 {EU,RoW}. Capital inputs translate into final output according to a CES form:
Q =

(AEUKEU)
  1
  + (ARoWKRoW )
  1
 
   
  1
where AEU and ARoW are region specific productivity shocks. Suppose that carbon emissions
are a linear function of capital: CO2R = ⇢KR for R 2 {EU,RoW}. For simplicity suppose that
capital (user) costs r are uniform across regions. However, there is a charge ⌧EU for emitting
carbon in the EU and an even higher charge ⌧ETS for ETS regulated firms.
For a given quantity of output Q cost minimization implies the following cost function:
C (Q, r, ⌧) = Qc (r, ⌧) = Q
"✓
⇢⌧ + r
AH
◆1  
+
✓
r
AF
◆1  # 11  
where we assume for simplicity that firms always invest in both locations.
Emissions in each location are then given by:
CO2EU = QA
  1
EU
 
⇢⌧ + r
c (r, ⌧)
!  
CO2RoW = QA
  1
RoW
 
r
c (r, ⌧)
!  
Final output demand is described by a simple log linear form:
Q = ⇤⌘ 1P ⌘
where ⇤ is a firms specific demand shock.
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Profit maximization implies markup pricing
P = µc (r, ⌧)
where µ = 1
1  1⌘
Equilibrium output is consequently determined by
Q = ⇤⌘ 1 (µc (r, ⌧)) ⌘
Hence:
CO2EU = ⇤
⌘ 1µ ⌘c (r, ⌧)  ⌘ A  1EU (r + ⇢⌧)
   (4)
CO2RoW = ⇤
⌘ 1µ ⌘c (r, ⌧)  ⌘ A  1EU r
   (5)
We are now in a position to precisely define carbon EU leakage. We can measure the extend
of carbon leakage by the change RoW emissions due to a increase of CO2 pricing in the EU
 LeakCO2RoW =
@CO2RoW
@⌧
 ⌧
Looking at equation 5 we see that leakage will occur if the cost increase from a change in
⌧ has a negative e↵ect on CO2 emissions in RoW, which will be the case if   > ⌘. Put
di↵erently, leakage will not occur if EU and RoW capital are highly complementary (  ! 0)
or if the demand for a firm’s output is highly elastic (⌘ ! 1). Equation 5 also illustrates
what it takes detect and quantify leakage in our firm level data: we would need controls for
region specific shocks as well as firm specific shocks apart from changes in carbon prices or
appropriate instruments. Alternatively, consider the equations 4 and 5 in terms of di↵erences
of log changes, i.e. approximately the di↵erence in growth rates:
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  lnCO2EU    lnCO2RoW = (    1)  lnAEU      ln (r + ⇢⌧)  (    1)  lnARoW +    ln r
(6)
Suppose a firm experience and increase in carbon prices from 0 to ⌧ due to the ETS. We can
re-write 6 approximately as
  lnCO2EU    lnCO2RoW ⇡ (    1)  lnAEU   (    1)  lnARoW    
r
⇢⌧
In other words if EU and RoW capital services are highly substitutable (  is large), the carbon
price increase ⌧ is large relative to other capital cost factors r and other region specific pro-
ductivity shocks have only confounding influence, then we should see that EU CO2 emissions
grow more slowly than RoW emissions.
Similarly, we can look at the EU share in emissions:
sEU =
A  1EU (r + ⇢⌧)
  
A  1ROW r  
Hence, provided that region specific productivity shocks are not confounding things, an increase
in carbon prices ⌧ should lead to a reduced EU share if there leakage is occurring.
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B Additional Specifications
Extended Period: 2005-2010
Table 4: Regressions of the share of emissions in EU (period: 2005-2010)Sheet1
Page 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Change in share of emissions from Europe
All Firms in Sample
ETS 0.000 0.016 0.016 0.017
(0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.025)
Observations 543 202 298 187
R-squared 0.028 0.074 0.057 0.080
Number of Firms 437 172 247 159
47 36 46 35
Manufacturing Firms
ETS 0.002 0.019 0.012 0.018
(0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 227 106 123 95
R-squared 0.012 0.030 0.035 0.046
Number of Firms 184 90 103 81
28 26 27 25
Manufacturing Firms “at risk of Carbon Leakage”
ETS 0.020 0.049* 0.030 0.037
(0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 165 78 85 72
R-squared 0.037 0.164 0.090 0.178
Number of Firms 133 68 74 63
18 17 17 16
Year Fixed E7ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Fixed E7ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number ETS Firms
Number ETS Firms
Number ETS Firms
Notes: ETS is a dummy equal to 1 for the ETS regulated companies and zero otherwise. First column: All
companies; Second column: companies reporting positive emissions BOTH in EU and non EU (non
necessarily at the same time); Third column: companies reporting positive emission in EU in their first
period; Fourth column: companies reporting positive emissions in EU in their first period and positive
emission in non EU at some point in time. Clustered standard errors at the company level are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Adding Control Variables
Table 5: Regressions of the share of emissions in EUSheet1
Page 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Change in share of emissions from Europe
All Firms in Sample
ETS 0.003 0.025 0.021 0.026
(0.018) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027)
-0.019* -0.036 -0.019 -0.041
(0.011) (0.029) (0.016) (0.027)
-0.015 -0.006 -0.023 -0.007
(0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.044)
Observations 495 184 279 170
R-squared 36 98 70 108
Number of Firms 411 160 235 148
46 35 45 34
Manufacturing Firms
ETS 0.007 0.028 0.019 0.028
(0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
-0.088 -0.098 -0.097 -0.095
(0.106) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110)
0.022 0.013 0.017 0.012
(0.013) (0.034) (0.023) (0.041)
Observations 212 100 116 89
R-squared 0.021 0.049 0.051 0.071
Number of Firms 183 90 102 81
28 26 27 25
Manufacturing Firms “at risk of Carbon Leakage”
ETS 0.026 0.062** 0.039 0.050*
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.025)
-0.023 -0.041 -0.029 -0.031
(0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029)
0.084 0.037 0.092 0.017
(0.079) (0.117) (0.111) (0.127)
Observations 153 74 80 68
R-squared 0.045 0.222 0.110 0.253
Number of Firms 132 68 73 63
18 17 17 16
Year Fixed E7ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dassets
Dturnover
Number ETS Firms
Dassets
Dturnover
Number ETS Firms
Dassets
Dtunover
Number ETS Firms
Sectoral Fixed E7ects
Notes: ETS is a dummy equal to 1 for the ETS regulated companies and zero otherwise. First column: All
companies; Second column: companies reporting positive emissions BOTH in EU and non EU (non
necessarily at the same time); Third column: companies reporting positive emission in EU in their first
period; Fourth column: companies reporting positive emissions in EU in their first period and positive
emission in non EU at some point in time. Clustered standard errors at the company level are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Changing Dependent Variable: time varying intervals relative to 2007 (t-2007)
instead of (t-t-1)
Table 6: Regressions of the share of emissions in EUSh et1
Page 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Change in share of emissions from Europe
All Firms in Sample
ETS 0.000 0.010 0.013 0.013
(0.013) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 628 233 337 209
R-squared 0.034 0.088 0.069 0.106
Number of Firms 435 172 246 159
47 36 46 35
Manufacturing Firms
ETS 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022)
Observations 255 134 144 116
R-squared 0.020 0.039 0.056 0.073
Number of Firms 183 90 102 81
28 26 27 25
Manufacturing Firms “at risk of Carbon Leakage”
ETS 0.018 0.031 0.029 0.027
(0.018) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 186 95 96 84
R-squared 0.032 0.086 0.091 0.119
Number of Firms 132 68 73 63
18 17 17 16
Year Fixed E6ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Fixed E6ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number ETS Firms
Number ETS Firms
Number ETS Firms
Notes: ETS is a dummy equal to 1 for the ETS regulated companies and zero otherwise. First column: All
companies; Second column: companies reporting positive emissions BOTH in EU and non EU (non
necessarily at the same time); Third column: companies reporting positive emission in EU in their first
period; Fourth column: companies reporting positive emissions in EU in their first period and positive
emission in non EU at some point in time. Clustered standard errors at the company level are in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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